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Governance Quality and Information Asymmetry
BY AHMED ELBADRY, DIMITRIOS GOUNOPOULOS, AND FRANK SKINNER
This paper explores the relation between corporate governance and asymmetric information.
We find that proxies for governance mechanisms that encourage the monitoring of managers
are inversely related to proxies for asymmetric information. Specifically, greater board
independence, board activeness and debt financing are significantly and inversely related
to the degree of asymmetric information as reflected in bid-ask spreads, volatility of
share returns, normalised share trade volumes and market value of shares traded. This
implies that corporate governance mechanisms that enhance managerial monitoring lead to
improvements in the informational environment of the firm.
Keywords: Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Asymmetric Information, Agency
Theory.
JEL Codes: G34, D82, G30, G32.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this study, we relate corporate governance mechanisms to measures of asym-
metric information. Specifically, we used bid-ask spreads, share return volatility
and share trading volume as proxies of asymmetric information. Shareholders
are well aware that managers can impose agency problems through shirking and
consuming excess perquisites (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Fama and Jensen
(1983)) but unlike the managers, shareholders are uncertain as to the extent of
these problems. This can lead to higher bid ask spreads, volatility and lower share
trading volumes as this uncertainty can cause shareholders to be more cautious in
buying shares than they would be in the absence of this information asymmetry.
Best practise in corporate governance can deal with the impact of this infor-
mation asymmetry in several ways. For example, some elements of best practise
in corporate governance such as an independent board of directors encourages
the monitoring of managers thereby making it difficult for managers to conceal
shirking and personal perquisite consumption. As another example, compensation
schemes such as share compensation reward managers for reducing agency prob-
lems. To the extent that a corporation has in place the elements of best practice
in corporate governance, shareholders can have greater confidence that agency
problems are under control. In turn this greater confidence can lead to lower bid
ask spreads, lower share return volatility and higher share trading volumes as
shareholders are less cautious in acting on new information and trade in shares
as they are less concerned about agency problems than they would have been
in the absence of these corporate governance elements. Therefore we ask, does
best practise in corporate governance enhance shareholder confidence that agency
problems are under control thereby reducing the impact of asymmetric informa-
tion and lead to an improvement in the market for the firm’s shares? Additionally,
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what are the governance mechanisms that encourage the monitoring of managers
and what is their relation with asymmetric information? Do these mechanisms
lead to improvements informational environment?
Our study is motivated by the theoretical work of Diamond (1985) and
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), who emphasize the effects of asymmetric in-
formation among the management of the firm and the shareholders on the market
for the firm’s shares. A general implication of these theoretical models is that that
stock-holder welfare can be improved in perfectly competitive and fully liquid
markets by disclosing data that reduce information asymmetry among investors.
While Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) use information disclosure as the means of
reducing asymmetric information, their points are more general, if a firm reduces
the impact of information asymmetry, it can also improve the liquidity of its shares
and reduce its cost of capital. A recent empirical example of this is Armostrong
et al. (2012) who suggest antitakeover laws as the means of reducing asymmetric
information. Another example is Jiang et al. (2011) who demonstrate that vol-
untary disclosures significantly attenuate information asymmetry risk associated
with ownership concentration.
Despite the voluminous literature on the general topic of corporate governance,
there has been limited investigation of the relation between the nature of the firm’s
corporate governance system and the degree of asymmetric information and some
of the little evidence that has been acquired is contradictory. For instance, Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), Perotti and Thadden (2003), Pawlina and Renneboog (2005)
and Florackis and Ozkan (2009) find that the presence of large shareholders are
inversely related to asymmetric information and improve long-term performance.
In contrast, Heflin and Shaw (2000) and O’Neill and Swisher (2003), Belghitar
et al. (2011) find that greater institutional ownership is associated with greater in-
formation asymmetry, as there is a lower degree of informed trading. Meanwhile,
studies that do examine the relation between corporate governance and asymmet-
ric information usually deal with limited aspects, or individual mechanisms, of
corporate governance. In contrast, we provide a more comprehensive view of the
relation between corporate governance and asymmetric information by exploring
the ability of eight proxies for aspects of corporate governance to explain five
measures of asymmetric information all the while controlling for self-selection
bias, and size and industry effects.
We explore five elements of corporate governance that can be used to control
agency problems either by enhancing monitoring systems or by incentivizing man-
agerial behaviour. The first and second elements are that the more independent
and the more active the board of directors, the more effective the board can be in
monitoring the shirking and perquisite consumption behaviour of managers. The
third element is that compensation schemes that are designed to enhance perfor-
mance also incentivize managers to reduce shirking and perquisite consumption.
The fourth element is more complex. On the one hand, dominate shareholders can
monitor management closely thereby discouraging shirking and excess perquisite
consumption. On the other hand, dominate shareholders can encourage managers
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to act in their best interests rather than all shareholders. Therefore, like uncertainty
in the level of agency problems, increases in ownership concentration can also
increase uncertainty in the likelihood that managers can take actions to the detri-
ment of the majority of shareholders leading to uncertainty in the value of shares,
larger bid ask spreads, higher volatility and lower share trading volumes. The fifth
element is that debt financing improves the monitoring of management, thereby
making it more difficult for managers to conceal shirking and excess perquisite
consumption.
We find that proxies related to board independence, board activity and
debt financing are inversely related to the degree of asymmetric information,
whereas ownership concentration and performance-related executive compensa-
tion schemes is not significantly related to the degree of asymmetric information.
We control for self-selection, size and industry effects and conduct robustness
checks based on a composite asymmetric information measure derived from a prin-
cipal component analysis of four standard measures of asymmetric information,
as well as the economic environment and calendar year. Our results are confirmed
by the composite asymmetric information variable. Interestingly, our robustness
checks for the economic environment finds that ownership concentration is di-
rectly related to the degree of asymmetric information and the significance of this
result is concentrated during the height of the recent financial crisis. Moreover,
board independence and debt financing are robust with respect to calendar year.
In other words, we find that governance mechanisms that encourage board inde-
pendence, greater board activity and debt financing, appear to improve the firm’s
informational environment through a more efficient market for the firm’s shares.
Overall, our results also suggest that the recommendations of the Combined Code
on Corporate Governance (Financial Reporting Council 2010) regarding board
independence and activity can play a role in controlling information asymmetry
leading to enhanced confidence in the share price as manifest in lower bid ask
spreads and volatility and higher trading volumes.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses
the literature and the following section presents hypothesis concerning the five
elements of corporate governance that we examine. Our fourth section explains
the model and the sample selection. Our fifth section presents the results followed
by a sixth section that reports our robustness checks. Finally, we present our
conclusions.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
According to agency theory,1 agency problems arise as a result of the divergence
of interests among agents and principals (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, (1976);
1The literature has many models and theories related to the concept of asymmetric information.
Kennedy et al. (2006) review asymmetric information models in a multi-period setting to explain
under-pricing in IPOs. These models are signalling, information production, market feedback, en-
trepreneurial losses, changing objective function, and the information momentum models. Deshmukh
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Shleifer and Vishny, (1997); Miller (2002)). Principals cannot resolve agency
problems because of asymmetric information concerning the efforts and actions of
agents. Because the principals cannot perfectly monitor or measure the behaviour
of agents, agency problems are unresolved. They are manifest when the agents
(managers) impose additional direct costs on the firm such as consuming personal
perquisites or by imposing opportunity costs such as shirking, and by imposing
uncertainty in the value of the firm’s shares since the existence but not the extent
of these agency problems is known to the market (Jensen and Meckling, (1976);
Fama and Jensen (1983)).
Corporate governance mechanisms are an indirect and probably imperfect tool
by which shareholders, as principals, attempt to control agency problems by chang-
ing the behaviour of managers, who are the agents of the shareholders (Deshmukh
(2005), Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Whalen (2007); Chen et al. (2007); Connelly
et al. (2009)). Managers’ actions can be changed by mitigating the effects of asym-
metric information in many ways. For instance, a significant portion of managerial
compensation can be tied to the share price via share price compensation thereby
linking higher compensation to lower shirking and perquisite consumption. In
addition, corporate governance mechanisms can discourage agency problems by
increasing the effectiveness of monitoring systems, say by increasing the number
of independent directors on the board. These measures inhibit collusion, and make
it more difficult for managers to hide their perquisite consumption and shirking
behaviour, while opening a window through which the shareholders view the
behaviour of the managers. Importantly, these elements of corporate governance
mechanisms enhance the confidence of shareholders that agency problems are
under control leading to greater confidence in the share price. In turn, greater
confidence in the share prices leads to lower bid ask spreads, lower share return
volatility and higher share trading volumes as shareholders are more willing to
trade on the basis of smaller refinements in their understanding of the value of the
shares.
There are some studies that do examine the relation between corporate gov-
ernance and asymmetric information. However, they usually deal with limited
aspects, or individual mechanisms, of corporate governance. Cai et al. (2006),
Hillier and McColgan (2006), Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) and Holm and Scholer
(2010) find that board independence is inversely related to asymmetric infor-
mation. Chen and Nowland (2010) suggest that increasing board independence
advance the interests of minority investors through mitigating the underinvestment
problem. Wruck (1993) and Kang, Kumar and Lee (2006) examine the importance
of the form of executive compensation in reducing agency problems and mitigat-
ing asymmetric information. Chi and Scott-Lee (2010) show that high amounts
of free cash flow strengthen the influence of the quality of corporate governance
practices on firm value and Chen et al. (2013) find that external financing needs are
(2005) classified the theories of asymmetric information which related to the dividend policy into two
theories, pecking order theory and signalling theory.
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inversely related to information asymmetry. Belghitar and Khan (2011) suggest
that internal governance mechanisms are more effective for enterprises with high
growth investment opportunities, while external governance mechanisms, such as
capital market monitoring, are more efficient for firms with low growth investment
opportunities.
Overall our paper is related to a particular stream of literature that examines the
relation between governance quality and corporate boards in specific settings, such
as CEO turnovers (Weisbach, (1988)), tender offers (Byrd & Hickman, (1992)),
poison pill adoptions (Brickley, Coles, & Terry, (1994)), acquisitions (Cotter,
Shivdasani, & Zenner, (1997)), corporate restructuring (Perry & Shivdasani,
(2005)), cost of debt (Francis, et al, (2012)), new product announcement (Lin
and Chang, (2012)) and banking sector Dermine (2013).
III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The more independent the board is from executive control the more effective
the board will be in monitoring senior management. Accordingly, we expect that
the more independent the board, the greater confidence shareholders will have
that agency problems are under control and the lower will be the spread, volatility
and share trading volume. Similarly, the greater technical expertise of the audit
committee, the more effective this committee will be in monitoring the accounting
system and by implication, agency problems and the performance reward systems.
This will lead to greater shareholder confidence in the reported results and greater
confidence that agency problems are under control. Finally, Cai et al. (2006) note
that in recent years, boards are being pressured into becoming more diverse in the
belief that more diverse boards will be more effective monitors of management.
Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that gender diverse boards allocate more effort to
monitoring. Thus, we expect that the greater the diversity of the board, the more
effective the board will be in monitoring management and the greater control will
be placed on agency problems leading to lower spreads, volatility and higher share
trading volume. In summary our first hypothesis can be stated as follows.
H1. Ceteris paribus, there is an inverse relation between boards that are more
independent, expert and diverse and the degree of asymmetric information.
Our second governance category considers the activeness of the board of di-
rectors. More active boards should be more effective monitors of management
leading to greater control of agency problems. For example, Kanagaretnam et al.
(2007) suggest that boards and committees that meet more frequently are likely
to be monitoring management more closely. In turn, more effective monitoring of
management will lead to greater control of agency problems and greater share-
holder confidence in the share price leading to lower bid ask spreads and volatility
and higher trading volumes.
However, board meeting attendance and the number of board meetings can
be directly rather than inversely related to measures of asymmetric information
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as higher attendance and more meetings are needed to respond to controversies.
Specifically, the surrounding uncertainty regarding the resolution of controversies
can cause the bid ask spread and volatility to rise and the trading volume to fall
just as more meetings and higher attendance occur to resolve these controversies.
Therefore our second hypothesis is as follows.
H2. Ceteris paribus and controlling for controversies, more active boards are
inversely associated with measures of asymmetric information.
Our third governance category considers the impact of compensation schemes
for senior executives. Performance-related pay is designed to enhance shareholder
value by encouraging managers to reveal the level of effort they expend, and to
avoid shirking and consuming perquisites. Wruck (1993) shows that companies
with investment disincentives have CEO compensation that emphasizes equity
ownership relative to other forms of executive compensation. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) suggest that it is better to grant management long term incentives in order
to align management’s interests with those of investors. Additionally, according
to Kang, Kumar and Lee (2006), equity-based compensation is the most powerful
means of aligning the interests of the CEO and shareholders. Compensation pack-
ages that reward managerial performance and link compensation to the share price
can reduce agency problems because managers are encouraged to increase effort
and to avoid excess perquisites in order to increase the share price. Therefore,
we expect executives that receive performance related pay will avoid shirking
and consuming excess perquisites thereby reducing agency problems. Sharehold-
ers will expect this as well so that firms with performance related pay systems
will have lower bid ask spreads and volatility and higher trading volumes as
shareholders will have greater confidence that agency problems are under control.
Consequently, out third hypothesis is as follows.
H3. Ceteris paribus, there is an inverse relation between the presence of compen-
sation packages that include stock compensation and measures of asymmetric
information.
The effect of ownership concentration on asymmetric information is uncer-
tain. On the one hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Florackis and Ozkan (2009),
Gul et al. (2010), Lin et al. (2011) and Jiang et al. (2011) suggest that large
shareholders are effective in supervising management. Leung and Horwitz (2010)
show that firms with a more concentrated management (executive board) own-
ership displayed a better capital market performance during a period of crisis.
Correspondingly, Perotti and Thadden (2003) document that dominant investors
such as large lenders or large equity holders can improve corporate governance,
Boubaker et al. (2014) document that ownership concentration expedites the capi-
talization of firm-specific information into stock prices and decreases synchronic-
ity and Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) conclude that block-holders appear to play
a role in mitigating agency problems.
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On the other hand, more block-holders means more concentrated ownership,
where blockholders can influence management to take actions in the blockholders’
interests and contrary to the interests of other shareholders. Heflin and Shaw (2000)
and O’Neill and Swisher (2003) suggest that greater institutional ownership can
cause an increase in adverse selection problems. Carpenter, Indro, Miller and
Richards (2010) report an increase in asymmetric information for firms who’s
CEO has large ownership stakes. Therefore, we cannot predict a priori the sign
of the relation between measures of ownership concentration and measures of
asymmetric information.
Debt financing can be viewed as a mechanism to mitigate asymmetric infor-
mation because creditors are motivated to monitor the behaviour of management
in order to protect their claims. Degryse and Jong (2006) state that “leverage,
and particularly bank debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the
managerial discretion problem and asymmetric information problem”. Bebchuk
(2003) concurs with this, stating that company debt can act as a disciplinary
device to limit managerial discretion and asymmetric information, and works to-
wards aligning manager and shareholder interests. Francis et al. (2012) find that
loan terms are more favourable for boards that minimize information risk. This
leads to our fourth hypothesis:
H4. Ceteris paribus, there is an inverse relation between the level of debt and
proxies for asymmetric information.
IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION
We collect all the corporate governance information that is available on DataS-
tream for the eight corporate governance variables described below and match
them by company and year with the corresponding measures of asymmetric in-
formation and control variables. We find that there are 376 companies contained
in this database all of which are listed on the main board of the London Stock
Exchange. We start the data series in 2004 as prior to that year there are very few
companies, many of which also have missing values for several of the corporate
governance variables. Our database ends in 2010 as that is the last year that was
available to us. We chose to exclude financial firms such as Banks, Insurance Com-
panies and other miscellaneous financial firms because of extreme differences in
their capital structures and regulatory environment compared with other firms,
Switzer and Wang (2013).2 We include firms that have since left the database as
they have gone bankrupt (e.g., Woolworths), merged (e.g., Boots) or acquired (e.g.,
Cadbury) to avoid survivorship bias and we include new listings. Table 1 show that
the final sample is comprised of 324 UK firms. The largest components by indus-
try are consumer services (27.16%), industrials (25.62%), and consumer goods
(10.19%). The consumer services and industrials appear to dominate our sample.
2Switzer and Wang (2013) document that corporate governance structures have a greater impact on
US commercial banks than on other types of savings institutions.
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Table 1: Sample composition by industry
DEBT Market Value
Industry Number Percentage RATIO (in £ millions)
Basic Materials 24 7.41 16.70 9,829
Oil and Gas 24 7.41 19.82 7,775
Industrials 83 25.62 22.55 1,443
Consumer Goods 33 10.19 23.23 5,396
Health Care 10 3.09 19.08 12,478
Consumer Services 88 27.16 31.63 2,439
Telecommunication 5 1.54 30.31 25,388
Utilities 12 3.70 42.97 6,284
Real Estate 22 6.79 39.82 1,144
Technology 23 7.10 11.52 825
Total 324 100.00 25.68 3,917
Notes: The target population includes all non-financial UK companies listed in DataS-
tream’s Corporate Governance Database during the period 2004 to 2010. ‘Industry classi-
fication’ is made according to the nomenclature of the Industry Classification Benchmark
developed by Dow Jones. ‘Number’ refers to the number of companies in a given industry,
‘percentage’ refers to the percentage of the total sample represented by each industry and
total DEBT RATIO and market value reports the respective averages by industry.
Moreover, the tangibility of assets in the industrial as opposed to the service sector
is quite different so they may well choose different corporate governance systems.
Therefore, we control for industry effects by employing a dummy variable for
firms in the CONSUMER SERVICES and INDUSTRIAL industry sectors.
MEASURING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
As there is no generally accepted “best” measure of asymmetric information,
we choose four that are most commonly used in the literature: the bid ask spread,
volatility, share volume measured at market prices and the number of shares
traded.3 The definitions of all asymmetric information, governance and control
variables and the expected signs of the coefficient’s relation to asymmetric infor-
mation are reported in Appendix A.
Studies by George et al. (1991), Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995), Madhavan,
Richardson and Roomans (1997) and Huang and Stoll (1997) analyse the bid-ask
spread into its order processing, inventory holding and asymmetric information
components. However, Van Ness, Van Ness and Warr (2001) indicate a strong
correlation among all the components of the spread while Menyah and Paudyal
3There are many other proxies for asymmetric information. For example, Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr
(2001) suggest informed trader variables such as the number of analysts covering a given company and
the percentage of stock of a given company held by an institution. Kanagaretnam et al (2007) examine
other proxies, specifically earnings forecast dispersion, forecast revision volatility, the level of analyst
coverage and the change in share trade depth around quarterly earnings releases.
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(2000) find that, on the London Stock Exchange, the asymmetric information
component dominates the realised spread.4 Taken together, these studies suggest
that the adverse selection component behaves in much the same way as the entire
spread, and so justifies the use of the bid-ask spread as a proxy variable for asym-
metric information. Thus, we assume that the larger the SPREAD, the percentage
change in the bid ask spread as reported by DataStream, the larger will be the
degree of asymmetric information.
Van Ness et al. (2001) use the average volatility of daily stock returns in addition
to the bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry. Wang (1993) shows
that information asymmetry among investors can increase volatility, although
volatility can overstate the level of asymmetric information. Accordingly, we
assume that the higher the average volatility in stock returns VOLATILITY, the
higher will be the degree of asymmetric information.
We use share trading volume as our third measure, since Draper and Paudyal
(2008) indicate that the average trading volume is inversely related to asymmet-
ric information. According to Van Ness et al. (2001), average trading volume is
related to information asymmetry because less is known about less frequently
traded stocks. Acker, Stalker and Tonks (2002) report that high trading volumes
are associated with closing prices that are more often within the daily spread
and indicates lower levels of information asymmetry. Gajewski (1999) finds that
trading volume is larger on announcement days, suggesting that higher trading
volumes are associated with the possible release of information. Hence, we expect
that the higher the average trading volume, the lower will be the degree of asym-
metric information. As trading volume can be measured according to the number
of shares or the value of shares traded we chose to measure trading volume both
ways. Therefore TRADE VOLUME is the number of shares traded for a company
in a given year normalised by the number of shares in issue whereas TRADE
VALUE is the market value of a stock traded for a company in a given year, both
of which are decreasing in asymmetric information.
Finally, as a robustness check, we construct a composite variable of the above
conventional measures of asymmetric information COMPOSITE. We conduct a
principal component analysis of SPREAD, VOLATILITY, TRADE VOLUMNE
and TRADE VALUE and find that the first principal component of these four vari-
ables explains approximately 94.5% of the total variation of this data. This suggests
that the first component can form a good summary variable of these four different
measures of asymmetric information that can be used as a robustness check on the
relation between asymmetric information and corporate governance.5 We expect
that COMPOSITE is increasing in asymmetric information because COMPOSITE
4Menyah and Paudyal (2000) find that on the LSE on average 30% of the spread is the order processing,
23% is inventory and 47% is the asymmetric information components.
5The composite variable is measured from the correlation matrix. We standardize each observation of
SPREAD, VOLATILITY, TRADE VOLUMNE and TRADE VALUE and, for each row of observa-
tions; we multiply them by the first principal component’s eigenvector and sum the products to find
the composite variable’s value for a given observation.
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is positively associated with SPREAD and VOLATILITY and inversely associ-
ated with TRADE VOLUMNE, relations that are the same as those between these
proxies and asymmetric information.
MEASURING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
We develop eight proxies for corporate governance, grouped into five categories.
Specifically, the five categories are board composition, board activity, executive
compensation, ownership concentration and debt financing. We also incorporate
two control variables, MARKET VALUE to control for firm size and the number
of controversies CONTROVERCIES to control for unusual events. Our model for
dealing with self-selection also controls for industry effects by employing dummy
variables for INDUSTRIAL and CONSUMER SERVICES firms.
According to our first hypothesis, there is an inverse relation between boards
that are more independent, expert and diverse and the degree of asymmetric
information. We use three variables that measure the independence, expertise
and diversity of the board of directors. These are the percentage of independent
members serving on the board of directors INDEPENDENCE, the expertise of the
members of the audit committee EXPERT and the percentage of females on the
board of directors FEMALE. The greater the percentage of independent members
on the board of directors, the more independent the board will be from executive
control and the more effective the board will be in monitoring senior management.
Accordingly, we expect that the larger the percentage of independent members
serving on the board of directors, the greater confidence shareholders will have
that agency problems are under control and the lower will be the spread, volatility
and share trading volume.
We wish to determine whether the technical expertise of the audit committee
also leads to greater confidence in the share price. DataStream compiles a ranking
of the audit committee’s expertise EXPERT. Key considerations are the existence
of an audit committee, the number of independent members and the number of
members that can be considered a financial expert within the meaning of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Evidently, the Financial Reporting Council supported by
evidence from Chahine and Filatochev (2011) believes that the greater technical
expertise of the audit committee, the more effective this committee will be in
monitoring the accounting system and by implication, agency problems and the
performance reward systems. This will lead to greater shareholder confidence in
the reported results and greater confidence that agency problems are under control.
Therefore, we expect an inverse relation for audit committee expertise EXPERT
and proxies for asymmetric information.
Finally, Cai et al. (2006) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that gender
diverse boards allocate more effort to monitoring. Thus, we expect that the greater
the fraction of females on the board FEMALE, the more effective the board will
be in monitoring management and the greater control will be placed on agency
problems leading to lower spreads, volatility and higher share trading volume.
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Our second hypothesis suggests that, controlling for controversies, more active
boards are inversely associated with measures of asymmetric information. We
proxy the activeness of the board as the annual number of meetings of the board
of directors BOARD MEETS and the overall percentage attendance of members
of the board ATTENDANCE. Therefore, there should be an inverse association
between measures of asymmetric information and more frequent board meetings
with higher attendance. However, board meeting attendance and the number of
board meetings can be directly rather than inversely related to measures of asym-
metric information as higher attendance and more meetings are needed to respond
to controversies. Therefore, to control for this effect we include a variable CON-
TROVERCIES that counts the number of times during the year the company had
a controversy as reported in the financial press. We expect the value of this co-
efficient to be positively related to the bid ask spread and volatility and inversely
related to share trading volume.
According to our third hypothesis, we expect an inverse relation between the
presence of compensation packages that include stock compensation and measures
of asymmetric information. We use a dummy variable STOCK COMPENSATION
that takes on the value of one if senior executives receive compensation in the form
of stock. Therefore, we expect that the STOCK COMPENSATION coefficient
is negative. In contrast, the effect of ownership concentration on asymmetric
information is uncertain as the relation can be inverse if dominate shareholders
are more effective monitors of management or the relation can be positive if
there is a fear that dominate shareholders influence management to take actions
to their benefit against smaller shareholders’ interests. Therefore our measure of
ownership concentration, the single largest percentage ownership by an investor
BIG OWN, can be positive or negative.
Finally, our fourth hypothesis suggests that is an inverse relation between the
level of debt and proxies for asymmetric information as larger debt incentivises
debt holders to monitor management. We use the total debt to total assets ratio
DEBT RATIO, measured as of the beginning of the year, as a proxy for the level
of debt financing and expect the coefficient to be negative.
Table 2 provides the Pearson correlations between the corporate governance
and the continuous asymmetric information variables. Virtually all correlations are
fairly low indicating that collinearity is not likely to be a problem. The exceptions
are the correlations of TRADE VOLUMNE and TRADE VALUE measures of
asymmetric information with MARKET VALUE. This highlights the importance
of including MARKET VALUE as a control variable. Moreover, the correlation
between TRADE VALUE and TRADE VOLUMNE is also high. This motivates
us to include the principal component derived COMPOSITE variable as a fifth
proxy for asymmetric information. We then use COMPOSITE as a robustness
check to determine if a linear combination of these variables as well as SPREAD
and VOLATILITY can reinforce the conclusions obtained by separately using the
first four proxies for asymmetric information.
138 Ahmed Elbadry et al.
Ta
bl
e
2:
Pe
a
rs
o
n
C
or
re
la
tio
n VO
LA
TI
-
TR
AD
E
TR
AD
E
CO
M
PO
-
IN
D
EP
EN
-
BO
AR
D
AT
TE
ND
-
BI
G
D
EB
T
SP
RE
AD
LI
TY
VO
LU
M
E
VA
LU
E
SI
TE
D
EN
CE
EX
PE
RT
FE
M
AL
E
M
EE
TS
AN
CE
OW
N
RA
TI
O
SP
RE
A
D
1.
00
V
O
LA
TI
LI
TY
−0
.0
2
1.
00
TR
A
D
E
V
O
LU
M
E
−0
.1
8
−0
.0
1
1.
00
TR
A
D
E
VA
LU
E
−0
.2
2
−0
.0
2
0.
62
1.
00
CO
M
PO
SI
TE
0.
28
0.
18
−0
.1
3
0.
16
1.
00
IN
D
EP
EN
D
EN
CE
−0
.2
1
0.
11
0.
13
0.
22
0.
05
1.
00
EX
PE
RT
−0
.0
6
0.
04
0.
06
0.
11
0.
16
0.
27
1.
00
FE
M
A
LE
−0
.1
2
0.
02
0.
07
0.
13
0.
02
0.
19
0.
12
1.
00
B
OA
RD
M
EE
TS
−0
.0
5
−0
.0
1
0.
02
0.
00
−0
.0
5
−0
.0
3
0.
03
0.
05
1.
00
AT
TE
N
D
A
N
CE
0.
08
−0
.1
2
−0
.1
0
−0
.0
6
−0
.0
1
−0
.1
0
0.
08
−0
.0
2
−0
.0
2
1.
00
B
IG
OW
N
0.
15
−0
.0
2
−0
.0
4
−0
.0
5
0.
02
−0
.1
1
−0
.0
3
−0
.1
7
−0
.1
1
0.
03
1.
00
D
EB
T
R
AT
IO
−0
.0
7
−0
.0
4
−0
.0
1
−0
.0
1
−0
.1
1
−0
.0
3
0.
01
−0
.0
1
0.
06
−0
.0
4
0.
02
1.
00
M
A
RK
ET
VA
LU
E
−0
.1
9
0.
02
0.
60
0.
88
0.
14
0.
22
0.
12
0.
13
−0
.0
2
−0
.0
4
−0
.0
3
−0
.0
2
Governance Quality and Information Asymmetry 139
THE MODEL
We collect a panel data series for all 324 firms annually from 2004 to 2010,
potentially 2,268 observations. We have about half of these potential observa-
tions because of the turnover of listed companies for the reasons outlined above.
Consequently, our unbalanced panel data has a large number of individuals, 324
companies, and a small time series, at most seven years. We conduct a Hausman
specification test finding that the coefficients estimated via random and again us-
ing fixed effects estimators are not statistically different.6 Based on this test, we
follow the recommendations of Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Lutkepohl & Lee (1985),
page 527–9, and use the random effects estimator. Moreover, an analysis of vari-
ance test does reveal clear evidence of time effects. For these reasons, we intend
to fit a random effects model adjusted for time effects.
We wish to determine the effect corporate governance choice has on the degree
of asymmetric information. The relation between corporate governance and asym-
metric information can be endogenous as choices made in the design of corporate
governance systems can be influenced by the degree of asymmetric information
faced by the corporation and by industry membership. Therefore, we must adjust
our inquiry for self-selection bias.
Heckman (1979) provides the methodology for dealing with self-selection bias
by treating the problem as a case of an omitted variable. We follow Heckman’s
(1979) two stage procedure by first running a probit selection equation to extract the
inverse mills ratio and then use the inverse mills ratio as an independent variable
in an asymmetric information regression. The inverse mills ratio is presumed
to proxy for the influence of self-selection. The inverse mills ratio then serves
as a correction in the asymmetric information regression as it accounts for the
influence of self-selection on asymmetric information. Then, the second stage
asymmetric information regression can measure the relation among proxies for
corporate governance and asymmetric information free of endogeneity caused by
self-selection.
Our selection equation investigates determinates of the quality of corporate
governance. The selection equation is
P(G = 1) = F
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Constant + INDENENDENCEi,t + EXPERTi,t
+ FEMALEi,t + ATTENDANCEi,t
+ BOARD MEETSi,t + STOCK COMPENSATIONi,t
+ BIG OWNi,t + DEBT RATIOi,t
+ MARKET VALUEi,t + INDUSTRIALi,t
+ CONSUMER SERVICESi,t + εi,t
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(1)
6For 11 degrees of freedom, the critical value of the Hausman chi-square statistic at the 10% significance
level is 19.81. We obtain chi-square statistics of 1.37, 5.34, 2.80 and 0.17 respectively for the random
versus fixed effects estimators for the spread, volatility, trade volume and trade value panel regressions
of (2) so we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of random effects at even the 10% level.
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where i refers to a given firm and t a given year, and G is a dummy variable that
takes on the value of 1 if the quality of the company’s corporate governance is
greater than or equal to the median score for the quality of corporate governance
for firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, zero otherwise.
All else equal, we expect that larger firms MARKET VALUE will have a
stronger corporate governance system as larger firms, being high profile, are
likely more pressured into developing highly sophisticated corporate governance
systems and can also afford to do so. Firms in the CONSUMER SERVICES
sector can find it difficult to achieve high rankings for corporate governance
because the asset structure of firms in the consumer service sector tend to be
shorter term, less easily verifiable with less debt capacity than other firms. For
the same reasons, INDUSTRIAL firms can find it easier to score high rankings
for corporate governance. We estimate (1) using the maximum likelihood probit
regression technique using robust standard errors.
The asymmetric information regression contains the governance and control
variables that we expect to determine the degree of asymmetric information.
Y j,i,t = α + βINDEPENDENCEj,i,t + βEXPERTj,i,t
+βFEMALEj,i,t + βATTENDANCEj,i,t
+βBOARD MEETSj,i,t + βCONTROVERCIESj,i,t
+βSTOCK COMPENSATIONj,i,t + βBIG OWNj,i,t
+βDEBT RATIOj,i,t + βMARKET VALUEj,i,t
+βMILLS RATIOj,i,t + εj,i,t (2)
where:
j = 1 = SPREAD,
j = 2 = VOLATILITY,
j = 3 = TRADE VOLUME,
j = 4 = TRADE VALUE,
j = 5 = COMPOSITE
and α is the regression intercept, εj,i,t is the random error term for each regres-
sion j and company i and date t and MILLS RATIO is the estimated inverse
mill’s ratio from (1). All other variables are as previously defined. Accordingly,
we study the effect of corporate governance variables on proxies for asymmet-
ric information using five (j) panel regression models on 324 (i) companies of
(potentially) seven (t) time series observations each using a random effects es-
timator adjusted for time effects all of which are corrected for self-selection
bias.
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Table 3a: Corporate Governance and Asymmetric Information: Main
Results
Governance Selection Equation Governance (G)
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic
CONSTANT −3.41*** −3.54
INDEPENDENCE 0.02*** 3.79
ATTENDANCE −0.01 −1.61
BOARD MEETS 0.04** 2.76
EXPERT −0.00 −1.20
FEMALE 0.02*** 2.96
STOCK COMPENSATION 0.42** 2.41
BIG OWN −0.03*** −6.19
DEBT RATIO 0.43 1.61
MARKET VALUE 0.51*** 10.61
INDUSTRIAL 0.30** 2.60
CONSUMER SERVICES −0.41*** −3.31
N 924
R− Squared 0.35
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Table 3a presents the results of the selection equation (1). These estimates
show that governance systems that receive the highest ranking are the ones that
have more independent INDEPENDENT, active BOARD MEETS and diverse
FEMALE boards that reward senior executive with STOCK COMPOSITION.
Firms with larger inside ownership BIG OWN have lower rankings. Meanwhile,
larger firms MARKET VALUE receive higher rankings than smaller firms, firms
with tangible assets INDUSTRIAL receive higher rankings and firms with fewer
tangible assets CONSUMER SERVICES receive lower rankings than other firms.
Table 3b reports the associated asymmetric information regression for five
measures of asymmetric information. While all regressions explain the relation
between asymmetric information and proxies for corporate governance to some
extent, the R-square of the model for TRADE VALUE is noticeably higher than
the corresponding R-squares for the other four proxies for asymmetric informa-
tion.7 Evidently, self-selection bias is not present for the SPREAD, VOLATILITY
and TRADE VALUE measures of asymmetric information as the MILLS RATIO
is not statistically significant. However, we detect the presence of self-selection in
the TRADE VOLUME and COMPOSITE measures of asymmetric information.
7It is possible that the high R square of this regression is due to the correlation between MARKET
VALUE and TRADE VOLUME. Replacing MARKET VALUE of the firm with the book value of the
firm does not make a material difference however, as the book value of the firm is highly correlated
with its market value (+0.7).
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Finally, MARKET VALUE is highly significant in four instances clearly high-
lighting the importance of including this variable as a control variable. Evidently,
larger companies have a lower bid ask spread and higher volatility and trading
values.
BOARD COMPOSITION
We find strong support for H1. All five regressions show that there is a
significant inverse relation between at least one proxy for best practise in the
board structure and the degree of asymmetric information in the market for the
firm’s shares. Specifically, board independence INDEPENDENCE is inversely re-
lated to SPREAD, VOLATILITY, TRADE VOLUME and COMPOSITE, diverse
FEMALE boards are inversely related to VOLATILITY, TRADE VOLUME
and COMPOSITE and finally, EXPERT boards are inversely related to TRADE
VALUE measures of asymmetric information.
BOARD ACTIVITY
We find strong support for H2 as once we correct for the confounding effects of
CONTROVERCIES, active boards are inversely related to proxies for asymmetric
information. ATTENDANCE is significantly related to SPREAD, VOLATILITY,
TRADE VALUE and COMPOSITE and BOARD MEETS is significantly related
to SPREAD, TRADE VOLUME and COMPOSITE, meaning that more frequent
and well attended board meetings are inversely associated with proxies for asym-
metric information. Interestingly, the number of CONTROVERCIES reported in
the financial press for the year is directly associated with SPREAD. If we remove
this variable, BOARD MEETS and ATTENDANCE often drop in significance in
Table 3b and falls from significant to insignificant in some of the later robustness
regressions. This indicates that indeed it is valuable to control for controversies be-
cause extra meetings can be scheduled to deal with crisis reported in the financial
press thereby obscuring the usual relation that frequent and well attended board
meetings are inversely associated with measures of asymmetric information.
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION
Interestingly, we find that ownership concentration BIG OWN is directly related
to TRADE VOLUME, otherwise this variable is not significantly related to any
other measure of asymmetric information. This suggests that ownership concen-
tration, rather than playing a monitoring role in reducing asymmetric information,
actually leads to greater anxiety on behalf of smaller shareholders suspecting that
management are persuaded to take actions that benefit large block-holders at the
expense of smaller shareholders. We find no support for H3 as we find that com-
pensation schemes that are designed to encourage performance are not related to
any of our measures of asymmetric information.
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DEBT FINANCING
Finally, H4 has strong support as we find that debt financing is inversely re-
lated to proxies for asymmetric information. Our proxy for debt financing DEBT
RATIO is statistically significant and of the correct sign for all proxies for asym-
metric information. Evidently, shareholders believe that lenders play an important
monitoring role as they periodically examine compliance with debt covenants and
so shareholders have greater confidence that agency problems are under control.
PARSIMONIOUS MODELS
We form a parsimonious asymmetric information regression model consisting
of the same control variables as (2) but with one proxy each for the five ele-
ments of corporate governance. Specifically, we drop the proxies ATTENDANCE,
EXPERT and FEMALE leaving INDEPENDENCE, BOARD MEETS, STOCK
COMPENSATION, BIG OWN and DEBT RATIO to proxy respectively, board
composition, board activity, compensation schemes, ownership concentration and
debt financing elements of corporate governance.8 This step is necessary for the
robustness work since we need to subdivide the sample in several ways so that
in some cases the full regression model has a small sample size. The parsimo-
nious model always has more data points so that we are always able to obtain
reliable estimates that are comparable across sub-samples. To be consistent, we
adjust the selection model by maintaining the same control variables as in (1) but
using the same five proxies for governance used in the parsimonious asymmetric
information regression.
Table 4a shows that the parsimonious probit model estimates are virtually the
same as the full probit model estimates of Table 3a except that DEBT RATIO
is now statistically significant and that the pseudo R-square is slightly smaller,
33% as opposed to 35% in Table 3a. The parsimonious asymmetric information
regressions are very similar to the full model estimates presented in Table 3b
except that BIG OWN is now only close to the 10% significance level in the
TRADE VOLUME regression, the marginally significant BOARD MEETS in the
SPREAD regression is now not significant and the previously significant BOARD
MEETS in the COMPOSITE regression is now only close to the 10% significance
level in Table 4b. Otherwise, what was statistically significant in the full model
is statistically significant is the parsimonious model with R-squares that are very
similar. Overall, we find that the results of the parsimonious two step model are
very similar to the full model giving us confidence that the parsimonious model
can used in our robustness work.
8We choose these five proxies for corporate governance as this combination obtained the largest sample
size as well as the highest pseudo R-square and R-square in the selection and asymmetric information
regressions, suggesting that of the available proxies, this combination explained the relation between
asymmetric information and asymmetric information the best.
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Table 4a: Corporate Governance and Asymmetric Information: Parsimo-
nious Results
Governance Selection Equation Governance (G)
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic
CONSTANT −5.06*** −12.35
INDEPENDENCE 0.01*** 3.92
BOARD MEETS 0.05*** 4.27
STOCK COMPENSATION 0.29** 2.01
BIG OWN −0.03*** −6.78
DEBT RATIO 0.46* 1.95
MARKET VALUE 0.55*** 12.50
INDUSTRIAL 0.24** 2.28
CONSUMER SERVICES −0.32*** −2.83
N 1042
R− Squared 0.33
VI. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of our robustness checks. We examine the
robustness of our results by economic conditions and by year of analysis. We
examine the results by economic conditions because our dataset encompasses a
radical shift from boom to bust economic conditions as the financial crisis of 2007
translated into a recession in 2008 and very slow and uncertain growth since. We
examine the results by calendar year because we wish to explore whether any
annual effect is driving our results, particularly since 2008, being the epicentre
of a severe recession can have an unusual influence. For all our robustness work,
we first estimate the parsimonious version of (1) as reported in Table 4a, then
we extract the inverse mills ratio from this regression and finally we employ this
inverse mills ratio as an independent variable in the parsimonious asymmetric
information regressions to correct for possible self-selection bias.
Table 5 confirms that the change in economic conditions does not change the
main story as reported in Tables 3b and 4b. For example, in Table 5 panel A, the
TRADE VOLUME regression in the 2004 to 2007 period reports that proxies for
board composition INDEPENDENCE, board activity BOARD MEETS and debt
financing DEBT RATIO are inversely related to proxies for asymmetric informa-
tion just as they are in the corresponding parsimonious regression in Table 4b.
These results are repeated in Table 5 panel B for the 2008 to 2010 recession and
slow growth economic period. However, there does appear to be some differ-
ences in the details. In the second period, STOCK COMPENSATION is inversely
related to asymmetric information for the TRADE VOLUME measure of asym-
metric information, but perversely positive (albeit marginally significant) for the
SPREAD measure of asymmetric information. Another interesting difference is
that ownership concentration BIG OWN is directly related to asymmetric infor-
mation thereby lending support to Carpenter, Indro, Miller and Richards (2010)
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who report an increase in asymmetric information for firms who’s CEO has large
ownership stakes.
We use TRADE VOLUME as the proxy for asymmetric information in the
year by year analysis because Tables 3, 4 and 5 consistently show that TRADE
VOLUME is the most useful measure for asymmetric information as it appears
to be most closely associated with aspects of corporate governance no matter
what set of economic conditions apply. Table 6 shows that our results are not
dominated by any given calendar year.9 It is interesting to note however, that
the direct relation between ownership concentration BIG OWN and asymmetric
information is concentrated in the 2008 calendar year. This hints that ordinary
shareholders were anxious that major shareholders could influence management
to take actions in the interests of major shareholders and contrary to the interests
of other shareholders during the recessionary conditions that prevailed in 2008.
The independence of the board of directors appears significant in every single
year. This empirical result is consistent with the rationale that outside directors
are selected on average in the interest of the shareholders.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Using a sample of 324 non-financial UK companies from 2004 to 2010, we
examine the relation among corporate governance mechanisms and asymmetric
information. While corporate governance mechanisms are designed to mitigate
agency problems, they can also alleviate investor’s concerns regarding an agency
problem information asymmetry. Specifically, shareholders are well aware that
managers can impose agency problems through shirking and consuming excess
perquisites but unlike the managers, shareholders are uncertain as to the extent
of these problems. We examine whether, after correcting for self-selection bias,
adopting best practise in corporate governance alleviates investors’ concerns re-
garding agency problems, thereby enhancing their confidence in the valuation of
the company and improving the informational environment of the firm.
We find evidence that there is an inverse relation between best practice corpo-
rate governance mechanisms and asymmetric information. Evidently, governance
mechanisms that enhance the monitoring role of the board of directors and use
debt to monitor management, improves the market for the firm’s shares by reduc-
ing the bid ask spread and stock return volatility and by increasing share trading
volume. This suggests that shareholders are more confident that agency problems
are under control when a firm adopts best practise corporate governance so are
more willing to trade in the firms shares.
Specifically, after correcting for self-selection bias, and controlling for industry
and size effects, we find that independent and active boards as well as the use
of debt financing are all inversely related to a variety of proxies for asymmetric
information. In contrast, we find little evidence of a significant relation between
9Note that we are unable to estimate a reliable cross sectional regression for calendar years prior to
2007 because some key variables such as INDEPENDENCE and AUDIT are missing too often so that
the sample size is not comparable to the reported regressions.
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performance related pay and greater ownership concentration with information
asymmetry. These results are robust with respect to a variety of measures of
asymmetric information, to economic conditions and to the year of analysis.
This study is limited in that it focuses on UK non-financial firms suggesting that
future research could extend this study to other developed or developing coun-
tries. Moreover it would be interesting to explore the relation between corporate
governance and asymmetric information for the financial sector. Additionally, the
importance of debt financing suggests that perhaps large creditors can play an
important monitoring role, an issue that has yet to be explored.
VIII. APPENDIX A
VARIABLES AND DEFINITIONS
Expected
relation with
asymmetric
Variable information Definition
Asymmetric information
SPREAD (+) The percentage change in the bid ask
spread from the previous day to today
averaged over the year.
VOLATILITY (+) The annual average of daily stock return
volatility
TRADE VOLUME (−) The number of shares traded for a stock in
a given year divide by the number of
shares in issue.
TRADE VALUE (−) The market value of a stock traded in a
given year, in millions
COMPOSITE (+) The first principal component of SPREAD,
VOLATILITY, TRADE VOLUME and
TRADE VALUE based on the
correlation among them.
Governance quality
G A dummy variable that takes on the value
of 1 if the quality of the company’s
corporate governance is judged by
DataStream to be greater than or equal
to the median score for the quality of
corporate governance for firms on the
FTSE 100, zero otherwise.
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Expected
relation with
asymmetric
Variable information Definition
Board Composition
INDEPENDENCE (−) Percentage of independent board members
EXPERT (−) A percentage ranking by DataStream. Key
considerations are the existence of an
audit committee, the number of
independent members and the number of
members meeting the criteria of
“financial expert” within the meaning of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
FEMALE (−) Percentage of women on the board of
directors
Board Activity
BOARD MEETS (−) The number of board meetings during the
year
ATTENDANCE (−) The average overall attendance percentage
at board meetings
Compensation Schemes
STOCK COMPENSATION (−) A dummy variable that takes on the value
of 1 if senior executives receive
compensation in stock, zero otherwise
Ownership concentration
BIG OWN (?) Single biggest owner ownership percentage
Debt Financing
DEBT RATIO (−) The beginning of year annual ratio of total
debt to total assets
Control variables
INDUSTRIAL A dummy variable that takes on the value
of 1 if the industry classification of the
firm is industrial, zero otherwise
CONSUMER SERVICES A dummy variable that takes on the value
of 1 if the industry classification of the
firm is consumer service, zero otherwise
CONTROVERCIES (+) The number of times a company had a
controversy reported in the financial
press for the year
MARKET VALUE (−) The beginning of year share price
multiplied by the number of ordinary
shares in issue in millions
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